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The Adversary Society: Keynote Address of the
Third Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture
Series
WiLumi

H. REHNQUIST*

In recent years litigants have pressed the courts to resolve
disputes which were formerly regulated by other socialand political institutions. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stresses the crucial importance of nongovernmentalinstitutions in our society. He discusses the need to evaluate the disruptive effect of an adversary
proceeding between parties who must continue in an ongoing
relationshipafter their dispute has been settled. The authorthen
suggests that in order to preserve certain social institutions, limits must be placed on the use of adversaryproceedings.

There are undoubtedly as many doors by which one may enter
the subject of today's lectures as there are exits by which one may
leave it. The subject is both so broad and so fascinating that I see
little to be gained by explaining why I have chosen one particular
approach over several other equally good and perhaps better entries.
The very words "adversary society," without the subtitle annexed
to them, suggest a part of the world which is peculiarly familiar to
lawyers and judges. It suggests at the very least, if not a system of
dispute resolution by means of courts, a means of dispute resolution
through what Judge Friendly has called "some kind of a hearing"
in his well known article bearing that title,' the words of which were
in turn extracted from Mr. Justice White's opinion for our Court in
Goss v. Lopez' three terms ago.

For the purpose of my remarks, I propose to avoid any extended
analysis of existing bodies of constitutional law, statutory law,
whether state or federal, and decisional law of the courts. The first
reason for taking this approach is that it avoids the necessity on the
part of the speaker of acquiring a great deal of knowledge which he
does not already possess. The second reason, and I hope an equally
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
2. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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good one, is that I think something can be gained from looking at
the subject in a purely jurisprudential way. The adversary system
and its presuppositions, therefore, will not be examined on the basis
of what the Constitution of the United States requires or what rights
various statutes or decisions may provide. Instead, I will try to take
the measure of our adversary system as a useful tool in the maintenance of a good society or the building of a better society.
A society which can be described, even in part, as "adversary"
assumes some sort of public system for dispute resolution. In this
system the parties to the dispute will have an opportunity to make
some sort of a pitch for their position to someone else whose job it
is to resolve the dispute. The subtitle of this forum further focuses
on the use of litigation to solve what are described as "social problems," thereby, at least to me, intimating a problem the dimensions
of which exceed the importance of the resolution of the particular
controversy to those immediately embroiled in it. We all know there
has been a great deal spoken and written about the use of the courts
and of the law as a vehicle for social reform,3 and there will undoubtedly be a great deal more spoken and written on the same subject.
It is one that cannot fail to attract the abiding interest of anyone
interested in a self-governing society such as ours. Because so much
has been spoken and written on this particular aspect of the subject
of today's forum, I have chosen to go at the matter from another
angle.
I will first suggest that the adversary system can be used in a
broad spectrum of situations. Some of these clearly call for such
proceedings in all but the most exceptional circumstances, but in
others adversary proceedings entail substantial risks as well as advantages. I will then briefly explore what it is about this latter class
of situations that counsels rejection of dispute resolution through a
hearing before an impartial tribunal. I will concentrate particularly
on those instances in which disruption to a continuing and valuable
institutional relationship is threatened by a completely adversary
proceeding.
Adjudicatory review of the decisions of certain institutions,
while perhaps ensuring a "better" decision in some objective sense,
can only disrupt ongoing relationships within the institution and
thereby hamper the ability of the institution to serve its designated
societal function. While we might conclude that the harm done to
these institutions is more than offset by the advantages of impartial
3. For a recent discussion of my views on this topic, see Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 Tax. L. Rgv. 693 (1976).
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review of the institution's decisions, at a minimum we must be
aware of the harm we are doing to these institutions and be very
certain that we are satisfied with the overall results of adversary
review. Finally, after some brief philosophical musings, I hope it will
become evident that while my position on this issue cannot easily
be labeled "conservative" or "liberal" according to any modern day
understanding of those terms, I do find myself in very good philosophical company when I express some skepticism about the desirability of adversary proceedings in a number of situations.
An adversary society which employs litigation to solve social
problems, or even disputes of far less moment, necessarily assumes
correlative rights and duties as between one individual and another
and as between the individual and the government. Only if there are
such rights and duties, which are brought into play by the existence
of certain happenings, is there any litigable issue. Lawyers and
judges take for granted not only the existence of an adversary system for the resolution of disputes, but assume, often with very little
critical analysis, that the advantages of such a system uniformly
outweigh its disadvantages. Those of us brought up in the legal
tradition tend to feel that our relationships with virtually all of the
people and the institutions with whom we have contact should be
regulated by law. This is not to say that there is to be a perference
for forbidding conduct rather than allowing it, but only that the law
speaks in both situations. This essence, though volumes have been
devoted to it, is probably encapsulated best in Bracton's Latin
phrase inscribed on the Langdell Hall of Harvard Law School: "Non
Sub Homine sed Sub Deo et Lege," which can be translated as,
"Not under man, but under God and the law." I am suggesting that
the "adversary system" with its use of litigation is not capable of
being valued in gross, and that its uncritical expansion is demanded
neither by Bracton's maxim nor by the general principles we associate with a government of law.
The adversary system is best viewed as an expansive continuum. At one end of the continuum is the traditional common law
writ of habeas corpus, which is unquestionably desirable. At the
other end of the continuum is a series of specific examples which I
will describe to you. It seems to me that the desirability of submitting these examples to an adversary process is subject to a great deal
of doubt. Let us begin at one end of the continuum with the writ of
habeas corpus, which signifies the right of one held in official custody to sue out a writ whereby the judge of some court of law will
call upon the official custodian to justify to the court the reasons for
detaining the prisoner. What should be required by way of explanation sufficient to satisfy the court issuing the writ is not the subject
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of this discussion. Whether it should be invariably sufficient that
the petitioner is held pursuant to a judgment of conviction and
sentence rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, or whether
the habeas court should be authorized to further inquire into other
issues of fact or law which the petitioner wishes to raise, in no way
detracts from my basic thesis that the writ of habeas corpus, as
understood in English common law, is undoubtedly the most basic
example of the adversary system in action. So long as individual
freedom is recognized as a matter of vital concern in society, the
deprivation of that freedom by a representative of the society should
be all but invariably sufficient to call into play an adversary process
whereby the detention must be justified before what may be called
in the familiar language of the law "a neutral magistrate."
Some may ask why the word "invariably" in the previous sentence should be qualified by the phrase "all but." But the qualification is not mine; it is that of the Founding Fathers, expressed in
article I, section 9 of the Constitution of the United States in these
words: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."'
Thus, jealous as they were of the writ of habeas corpus and
highly as they valued individual freedom, they did not give the writ
unqualified constitutional protection. Rather, when Congress appropriately provides, one who is wholly innocent of any wrongdoing
but is nonetheless seized and held in the custody of the national
government may not be heard even to assert or try to prove these
claims under the adversary system in our courts. This is surely
rather convincing evidence that in certain rare situations the
Founders viewed the individual as, at least temporarily, having no
rights which he might assert against the government. If this be
true of a claim to personal liberty from wrongful seizure by the
government, without any pretense of there having been a trial or
judgment of conviction, then surely there must be supportable
grounds for even greater reservations about the adversary system
and the pitting of one individual against another or the individual
against the government with a neutral magistrate as referee, in
contexts less historically significant than that of governmental
abridgement of personal liberty.
Two general classifications of cases outside of the traditional
field of personal liberty come to mind in which courts have recognized that decisions of nongovernmental institutions which affect
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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their members adversely shall not be reviewable under the normal
adversary process.5 Those situations will be described by way of
example. One such example is Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevichl decided by our
Court two terms ago. There, a dispute had arisen between two factions of the Serbian Orthodox Church in North America, each faction seeking control of the property and assets of the church. The
Supreme Court of Illinois, applying to this case the law that it would
have applied to disputes arising among members of other voluntary
organizations, ruled in favor of the faction which had lost within the
ecclesiastical court system. Our Court reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, saying that, because of the first amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion, no state court is
free to apply its own law in such a way as to overturn the decision
of an ecclesiastical court in a situation such as this.8 Thus, however
wrong the decision of the ecclesiastical court may have been, however "arbitrary and capricious" it may have been under the standards of administrative review, this type of claim is not to be put
to the test under the adversary system. The reason, according to our
Court, is again to be found in the Constitution. The Constitution
places a higher value on religious freedom than it does upon neutral
resolution of disputes which may arise between factions within a
church.
Another, and very important, example of a type of dispute
which is not submitted to customary adversary resolution in courts
is the claim of an individual worker under a collective bargaining
contract that the employer has violated some provision of a contract
and thereby harmed the worker. Since most collective bargaining
agreements contain arbitration provisions, and since courts have
held for a number of years that remedies under the contract must
be exhausted before resorting to the courts, it may be fairly said that
this type of dispute is kept out of the courts largely as a matter of
voluntary consent. But this is not a satisfying or consistent explanation of the extreme reluctance of the courts to entertain litigation,
not only involving disputes between individual employees and their
5. For several reasons which have seemed sufficient to me, I have omitted the entire

subject of official immunity, which could very well be treated as another example, and a very
important one, of a legal doctrine which permits cognizable wrongs to go unredressed because
of the high social cost of redressing them.
6. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
7. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill.
2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
8. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 708-25 (1976).
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employer under a collective bargaining contract, but also involving
claims by employees that the collective bargaining representative
failed properly to represent them in the processing of the grievance.
There are rather clear implications in more than one opinion from
our Court that the institution of collective bargaining and the labor
union as an institution are both entities which may not be subjected
to quite the same degree of adversary exploration as comparable
institutions in other areas of economic life.'
Many years ago, I had the privilege of being a law clerk to
Justice Robert H. Jackson when he was a member of our Court.
Long before I came into his service, he had written the Court's
opinion in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,10 wherein an employer insisted
that it had no statutory obligation to bargain with a union respecting individual employment contracts which it had negotiated with
its employees. Our Court upheld the finding that this action by the
employer constituted an unfair labor practice and, in so doing,
made the following observation:
But it is urged that some employees may lose by the collective agreement, that an individual workman may sometimes
have, or be capable of getting, better terms than those obtainable
by the group and that his freedom of contract must be respected
on that account. . . . The practice and philosophy of collective
bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages.
Of course, where there is great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity of employees, it is possible for the collective
bargain to prescribe only minimum rates or maximum hours or
expressly to leave certain areas open to individual bargaining.
But except as so provided, advantages to individuals may prove
as disruptive of industrial peace as disadvantages. They are a
fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice of representatives; increased compensation, if individually deserved, is
often earned at the cost of breaking down some other standard
thought to be for the welfare of the group, and always creates the
suspicion of being paid at the long-range expense of the group as
a whole. .

.

. The workman is free, if he values his own bargain-

ing position more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in
practice go in as a contribution to the collective result."
9. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
10. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
11. Id. at 338-39.
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In a case decided nearly a quarter of a century later, Vaca v.
Sipes,' 2 the Court held that an individual employee could not compel the union, which was his collective bargaining representative, to
take his grievance to arbitration regardless of the union's view of its
merit, because if the law were otherwise "the settlement machinery
provided by the contract would be substantially undermined, thus
destroying the employer's confidence in the union's authority and
returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and
'3
unsystematic negotiation." '
In the case of the relationship between the employee, the employer and the union, the source of the law has been an act of
Congress as interpreted by the Court.1" The Court found that the
effect of the law was that individual rights, which would otherwise
have been recognized, were on particular occasions to be sacrificed
to the process of collective bargaining and the contracts which were
reached through collective bargaining.' 5
At this point, it may be a good idea to step back for a moment
and take a look at some of the policies which preserve institutional
decisions against claims of individual injustice in light of the principles underlying a self-governing democracy.
There is a great tendency among us to think that in purely
definitional terms "self-government" and "democracy" include or
somehow subsume individual liberty and freedom. But this simply
is not the case, and no one has better demonstrated it than E. H.
Carr in his book, The Soviet Impact on the Western World:
Confusion of thought is often caused by the habit common
among politicians and writers of the English-speaking world of
defining democracy in formal and conventional terms as "selfgovernment" or "government by consent." What these terms define is not democracy, but anarchy. Government of some kind is
necessary in the common interest precisely because men will not
govern themselves. "Government by consent" is a contradiction
in terms; for the purpose of government is to compel people to do
what they would not do of their own volition. In short, government is a process by which some people exercise compulsion on
others. This is as true of democracy as of other forms of government; the criteria are by whom, by what means, and for what,
the compulsion is exercised.'
12. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

13. Id. at 191.
14. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
15. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960).
16. E. CARR, THE SovIEr IMPACT ON THE WESTERN WORLD 10-11 (1947); see THE FEDERALIST

No. 51 (J. Madison).
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If Carr is right, as I believe he is, and the very concept of
government means the rejection, albeit by a democratic process, of
certain claims to individual liberty, the same is true of the rejection
of such claims by private institutions such as churches or labor
unions. The refusal of the courts to review these claims as they
would claims of individual rights made by members of other voluntary associations means that the law in these particular cases is
attaching special weight to the institutional decision. This special
weight is given perhaps because adversary litigation of the propriety
of those decisions would have more disadvantageous consequences
in terms of diminishing the usefulness of the institution than would
the ultimate resolution by the court of the claim of individual right.
Let us turn now to another institution, the family, which is so
familiar to us all that we may not even think of it as an
"institution." The degree to which family decisionmaking is to be
subjected to the adversary process has only recently been the subject of any substantial litigation. The family, therefore, is not an
institutional decisionmaker which is protected by an established
body of law in the same manner as hierarchical churches and labor
unions are protected. But traditionally, parents have made decisions for minor children of tender years, and the propriety of these
decisions has not been thought to be reviewable in any other forum.
Except in the most extreme of cases, however misguided the parents' judgment may appear to the hypothetical "neutral magistrate," children have simply not been thought of as having rights
which they might assert against such parental decisions. A prototype of the sort of decision I have in mind is the case where the child
is suffering from a serious disease and a competent physician recommends, after all palliative measures have failed, that an arm or leg
be amputated in order to stop the spread of the disease. Traditionally, in our society, if the parents choose to follow such a recommendation, a child of tender years, though he may be bitterly opposed
to it, is not thought to have any claim cognizable by a court or
agency outside of the family. The mother and father, as the head
and governors of the family, have been thought of as speaking for
the child in such a situation."
There has undoubtedly been a movement in recent years to
recognize what has been loosely described as "the rights of children," but that movement has still fallen far short of overturning
17. I cheerfully acknowledge my indebtedness in this portion of the discussion to Hafen,
Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations About Abandoning
Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605.
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8
the principle which I have just described. Cases such as In re Gault"
and Tinker v. Des Moines School District' did indeed recognize that
the freedom of speech and claims to fairness and judicial process
guaranteed by the Constitution were not limited to adults. But in
these cases and those which have followed them, the courts were
confronted with claims asserted by children with the support of
their parents against the state. The claims in those cases are thus
in quite a different posture than a claim asserted by the child to
have a court or agency review a parental decision to which he objects. Other more recent cases from our Court, arising in the context
of a minor's right to obtain an abortion, have come closer to recognizing a right of the child at least independent of the parents, if not
opposed to them."
The question remains, however, why it is that parents have
been allowed to speak for their children with respect to so many
decisions of vital importance in their children's lives. At least until
very recently, there has been no thought that the child should have
any hearing in a forum outside of the family in which to challenge
the parental decision. Undoubtedly, it is largely traceable to the
importance of the traditional family in our society, but I think a
strong case can be made for the proposition that a legal doctrine of
laissez-faire in this area has very defensible juridical roots." Any
sort of adversary hearing which pits parent against child is bound
to be disruptive, placing stresses and tensions on intra-familial relationships and weakening the family as an institution. I am no more
prepared to say that the preservation of the integrity of the family
as an institution is the summum bonum of the law than I am prepared to place a similar laurel wreath on the concept of an adversary
hearing. But, I think the integrity of the family as an institution is
an important and necessary factor which must be considered in
deciding whether, in an increasingly adversary society, children
shall have rights which may be asserted against their parents in an
adversary context.
18. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976). For a discussion of the cases involving constitutional claims of parents to supervise
the actions of their children and cases involving successful claims of children to assert their
rights in opposition to the decision of their parents, see 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 63 (1977)
(analyzing cases from Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), to Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)). I acknowledge my indebtedness
to this student note for this portion of my discussion.
21. See Areen, Intervention Between Parentand Child:A Reappraisalof the State'sRole
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 891-910 (1975).
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I have assumed throughout these remarks that adversary litigation will indeed bring to light the truth with respect to the facts and
enable the decisionmaker to decide better whatever legal questions
are involved. I realize that reservations have been voiced as to the
ability of the adversary system to accomplish these results.22 But my
hypothesis is not that an individual's claim for redress of wrong
would be better vindicated in a nonadversarial system, but that in
some situations it is best not vindicated at all.
Because specific examples can shed more light on many jurisprudential discussions than can abstractions, I refer to Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic,23 a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. In Stillwater Clinic, the plaintiffs, following the birth of
their seventh child, consulted a doctor in Stillwater, Minnesota,
and, as the Supreme Court of Minnesota put it, "discussed with him
the various medical alternatives. available to them to ensure that
their family would grow no larger." 2 ' The doctor recommended that
the father have a vasectomy. The operation was performed in a
clinic of which the doctor was a member. On the record it was at
least permissible to find that the representation was made to the
parents that normal sexual intercourse would not thereafter result
in conception of any children. 5 The mother did become pregnant
and delivered a healthy baby boy a little more than a year after the
operation. Following this occurrence, the parents sued the doctor
and the clinic for negligence and sought to recover as an item of
damages the cost of educating and raising the child until the age of
majority.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, applying
normal rules of damages, held that if such damages could be proved
they were recoverable." The court noted that prior to 1967 such
"wrongful birth" actions had been looked upon with disfavor by the
courts, and plaintiffs in such cases had generally been unsuccessful.
But the court pointed out that in the intervening decade, the majority of courts confronting the issue had "allowed recovery for all
damages proximately caused by the physician's negligence, includ22. See Dama~ka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1083 (1975).
23. Minn. -,
260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
24. Id. at -_, 260 N.W.2d at 171.

25. At trial, the father testified that the physician neither advised him to undergo further
tests nor to continue using contraceptives. The semen test, however, had revealed the presence of live sperm cells which indicated that the father was not yet sterile. The parents,
relying on the erroneous belief that the operation had been successful, resumed normal sexual
relations without contraceptives. Id.

26. Id. at
LAW OF TORTS

& n.6, 260 N.W.2d at 174 & n.6 (citing W.
§§ 41-42 (4th ed. 1971)).
-

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
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ing the cost of rearing the child during his minority. These courts
have ordinarily required that damages be reduced by any benefits
conferred by the child through an application of the 'benefit rule."'" 7
The court opined:
Pretermitting moral and theological considerations, we are
not persuaded that public policy considerations can properly be
used to deny recovery to parents of an unplanned, healthy child
of all damages proximately caused by a negligently performed
sterilization operation. Analytically, such an action is indistinguishable from an ordinary medical negligence action where a
plaintiff alleges that a physician has breached a duty of care owed
2
to him with resulting injurious consequences. 1
The court went on to say:
Most troublesome is the matter of allowing recovery for the
costs of rearing a normal, healthy child. Ethical and religious
considerations aside, it must be recognized that such costs are a
direct financial injury to the parents, no different in immediate
effect than the medical expenses resulting from the wrongful conception and birth of the child. Although public sentiment may
recognize that to the vast majority of parents the long-term and
enduring benefits of parenthood outweigh the economic costs of
rearing a healthy child, it would seem myopic to declare today
that those benefits exceed the cost as a matter of law.2
Two justices of the Supreme Court of Minnesota took no part
in the decision, and the Chief Justice and Justice Peterson dissented. The dissenting opinion concludes with this language:
In so far as the majority decision permits parents to recover damages by proving their healthy child a net burden to them, it is
contrary to public policy, in my judgment. We should not permit
the courts to be used for this purpose. I would direct the trial
court to enter judgment for the defendant.3°
There is no doubt from reading the opinion of Justice Rogosheske for the majority of the court that he, too, was troubled by
the case. The majority opinion concludes with this paragraph:
The result we reach today is at best a mortal attempt to do
justice in an imperfect world. In this endeavor we are not unmindful of the deep and oftentimes painful ethical problems that
cases of this nature will continue to pose for both courts and
27. Id. at.,

28. Id.
29. Id. at
30. Id. at

260 N.W.2d at 174.
-,
-,

260 N.W.2d at 175.
260 N.W.2d at 177 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting).
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litigants. It is therefore our hope that future parents and attorneys would give serious reflection to the silent interests of the
child and, in particular, the parent-child relationships that must
be sustained long after legal controversies have been laid to rest.3
I would be hard pressed to find any case which more clearly
than this one embodies the adversary system of justice carried to its
ultimate conclusion, with all of the advantages and disadvantages
that flow therefrom. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in its opinion, referred to an earlier case disallowing recovery for this type of
damages, which had described the child conceived after sterilization
as an "emotional bastard" by reason of his learning that his birth
was attributable to a doctor's negligence and not his parents' desires. 2 If we reflect for a moment and remember that here at least
we are not talking about what is required by the Constitution of
United States, the Constitution of Minnesota, Minnesota statutes
or Minnesota decisional law, it seems to me that the result in this
case must inevitably give considerable pause to even the most vigorous advocate of the adversary system as well as the advocate of free
access to the courts for redress of individual wrongs. What is the
effect of such a lawsuit going to be upon the relationship between
these parents and this child from the time of his birth through the
subsequent seventeen or eighteen years which he will, in the normal
course of events, spend with his parents?
But equally troubling is the fact that this decision was apparently made without careful acknowledgement and weighing of the
values being undercut by the introduction of adversary proceedings
into the family setting. The dissenting judges did no more than
assert that they thought this decision "against public policy." The
majority opinion articulated to a greater degree the detrimental
impact that this sort of lawsuit might have on parent-child relationships. The author of the majority opinion thought, however, that
this was basically a question for the attorneys and litigants to resolve, and if they chose to invoke the judicial process the court
should proceed to entertain the suit.
Let me turn to one final example of the redress of grievances
through the adversary system of justice. A lead article in the
Michigan Law Review contains this language:
Through the repeated efforts of a woman legislator, Indiana has
abolished actions for seduction of females over twenty-one years
260 N.W.2d at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at -,
32. Id. at -,
260 N.W.2d at 173 (citing Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lyc. 19, 23, 111 Pa.
D.&C.2d 41, 45 (1957)).
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of age, for breach of promise to marry, and for criminal conversation and alienation of affections. Almost immediately New York,
and shortly thereafter Illinois, passed similar legislation, and at
least ten other states are now considering analogous proposals.33
Lest you think that the developments referred to in this article
are the result of the women's liberation movement, I must reveal to
you that the article appeared in May, 1935. The author, Nathan P.
Feinsinger, then an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Wisconsin, described a movement for legislative change which I can
remember reading about in the Sunday pictorial supplements of the
Milwaukee newspapers when I was growing up in Wisconsin. "Heart
balm" suits had been historically recognized by the courts for many
years. Included within this colloquial term were actions for breach
of promise to marry, seduction and alienation of affections. Professor Feinsinger's article, after discussing the arguments pro and con,
made these observations about the motivation for statutory abolition of such claims for damages:
The surface explanation of this unusual legislative receptivity is a reaction against the prevalence of blackmail peculiar to
these actions, the incongruity of applying the damage remedy to
injured feelings, and the perversion of that remedy by courts and
juries to express their emotional sympathy and moral indignation. . . .While the importance of the affectional relations of
husband and wife may still justify their legal protection, the social cost of such protection by means of an action for damages
may exceed its worth."
Near the end of the article, after discussing arguments in favor
of abolishing such actions, the author states that because such actions are peculiarly susceptible to abuse, they were singled out from
other actions to redress intentional injuries to feelings. He then
comments: "Three legislatures have presumably weighed these results against the sacrifice of meritorious claims and have abolished
the actions by large majorities." 5
It seems to me that a common thread runs through the remarks
I have made. Each of the examples I have mentioned involved situations in which courts either have, or arguably should have, refused
to have an adversary hearing on the merits of a claim because of
some overriding public policy which outweighed the virtues of an
adversary hearing. The policies militating against recognition of the
33. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33
34. Id. (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 1009.
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right to a hearing on a particular claim may, of course, be quite
different. And in trying to analyze them, it is easy to confuse substantive law with rules of pleading and procedure. Perhaps a specialist in the latter disciplines would simply state that all of my
examples amount to complaints which merely fail, or which I think
should fail, to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Obviously, therefore, no hearing, trial or any sort of adversary factfinding process is required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or cognate state rules of pleading and practice. But I think
there is more significance to these examples than this somewhat
tautological conclusion.
Many states abolished "heart balm" suits a generation ago because, as Professor Feinsinger observed, the benefits accruing from
the recognition of meritorious claims were outweighed by the abuses
resulting from allowing adversary trials of all such claims which
alleged the necessary substantive elements of a claim for relief. The
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus subordinates the very important right of an individual to demand judicial inquiry into the cause
for his confinement by the government to the needs of the government in time of invasion or rebellion. The refusal of courts to inquire
into whether religious denominations have properly applied ecclesiastical law is found in the first amendment's prohibition against
governmental interference with the free exercise of religion. The
extraordinary reluctance of courts to interfere with institutional
decisionmaking in the area of collective bargaining and the strong
arguments which can be made for a similar judicial reluctance in
the case of the family, while having their source in differing kinds
of law, seem to me to have this common thread: in each case, the
litigation of an individual's claimed deprivation of a right would
bring parties who must remain in a continuing relationship into the
adversarial atmosphere of a courtroom. To those of us trained as
lawyers and judges, the natural response is: "What other atmosphere would you expect in a courtroom than an adversarial one?"
But I think the judgment of those lawmaking bodies which have
been slow to allow the litigation of claims of individual deprivation
in these situations has been that the very crystalization of the parties' differences in the adversary process may threaten the future of
the institutional relationship.
Very likely few, if any, law students who have taken a course
in evidence since Wigmore's great treatise on that subject was written have not been exposed to the author's observation that crossexamination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever
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invented for the discovery of the truth."3 But I think anyone who
has been exposed to cross-examination in practice can see why Dale
Carnegie never listed it among the numerous methods which he
recommended for winning friends and influencing people. Generalizations in this area are indeed risky, but surely the adversary process, with all of its attendant judicial panoply, best serves its purpose when any continuing relationship between the contending parties is at an end. During an adversary hearing, the question before
the court is simply whose rights have been infringed and what damage has been caused by the infraction. To pit children against their
parents in these same surroundings, in order to determine whether
an operation recommended by a physician should or should not be
authorized by a court, may make for a better informed decision as
to the propriety of the operation, 7 but may leave the family unit in
a shambles.
If I am at least partly correct thus far, perhaps this analysis
suggests that the use of adversary-type litigation to solve social
problems may have more to commend itself in some situations than
others. Examples at the polar extremes may be helpful in expanding
this thesis. In Gilligan v. Morgan,38 our Court reviewed a decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in which
the original plaintiffs had been students at Kent State University
in May 1970 at the time when four students were killed by members
of the Ohio National Guard. The original defendants included the
Governor of Ohio at the time the suit was filed and the Commander
of the Ohio National Guard. Injunctive and declaratory relief, but
not damages, were sought.
Our Court ultimately held that the Sixth Circuit was wrong in
directing the district court to decide whether the practices of the
Ohio National Guard had led to the use of more force than was
necessary to suppress civilian disorders. Putting to one side all of
the complex constitutional and prudential principles which are
bound to attend such a case, I think it can be said with reasonable
assurance that then Governor Gilligan of Ohio, who had not been
in office at the time of the Kent State shootings, had no continuing
relationship with the student plaintiffs which would be jeopardized
by a hearing on the merits of their claims. I think the same may be
said for the Commander of the Ohio National Guard. Whatever
other claims might be made against courts deciding this sort of a
36. 5 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1974).
37. But see Damaka, supra note 22.
38. 413 U.S. 1 (1973), rev'g sub noma. Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1972).
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controversy, therefore, the claim that its very litigation would endanger the functioning of an existing societal institution could not
be made.
But can the same be said of the Stillwater Clinic case? 31 Or, if
you prefer, envision this hypothetical situation: An elementary
school child has been diagnosed to have a malignant type of cancer
which requires amputation of the child's leg in order to prevent the
disease from spreading to the rest of the body and from ultimately
proving fatal. The trauma to the family relationships which will
result from the mere existence of this situation, without the least bit
of judicial intervention, can hardly be overstated. But let us suppose
that, notwithstanding the fact that the parents are following the
recommendation of competent medical specialists in consenting to
such an operation, the courts of a particular jurisdiction should
decide that before the operation may be performed, the child must
be furnished independent advice of counsel, and if the latter shall
recommend it, a court hearing shall be held as to whether the operation should be performed. It may well be that the ultimate decision
reached by the court as to whether the operation should be performed will be no worse than that of the parents, and perhaps it may
be better. But can anyone seriously question that the very airing of
this dispute in an adversary forum will further traumatize the relationships not only between the parents and the child, but very likely
between one parent and the other?
One, of course, might ultimately conclude that the advantages
of an adjudicatory hearing in this setting outweigh any harm done
to the institutions. But, at a minimum, I think we must be aware
of the societal interests being sacrificed in pursuit of providing an
adversary forum for the vindication of what we perceive to be meritorious claims of individual right. I think we ought to judge each
situation carefully to make sure that the game is always worth the
candle.
I think it worth noting at this point that what I have suggested
does not relate directly to the concern expressed by others that the
judicial system is being overloaded."0 Thus, not surprisingly, the
solutions directed toward solving that problem, such as the proposal
that Congress file a Judicial Impact Statement with every piece of
39. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, Minn.__, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977) and text
accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
40. The recent Cecil Sims Lecture Series focused on the current pressure on the judiciary

which has been caused by a large caseload. For a collection of the presentations at that
symposium, see Discussion: Crisis in the Courts, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1978).
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legislation,4 ' while perhaps meritorious, will do little to alleviate the
concerns on which I am focusing. A Judicial Impact Statement will
help determine if the courts can adequately deal with the increased
case load resulting from certain legislation, but it will do nothing
to increase our sensitivity to the potentially deleterious impact such
legislation might have on existing institutions and the values embodied therein. Such a result could be obtained only if courts and
legislatures were to consciously weigh in the balance the damage to
socially desirable institutional relationships that could be caused by
the creation or recognition of every new cause of action.
As I conclude, let me freely admit that there is an element of
authoritarianism in the views that I have advanced this morning.
The subordination of a hypothetically provable claim of individual
wrong to the greater good of a private institutional arrangement
does not sit well with those of us nurtured in the libertarian tradition of western civilization, with those of us who have at least figuratively sat at the feet of Bacon, John Locke, Adam Smith and
Thomas Jefferson. But both the legal and the economic worlds in
which those men lived have long since passed us by, and the atomistic individualism which may have undergirded some of their
thought was never the doctrinal centerpiece of even the world in
which they did live. Government, we have been told by more than
one wise man, is the process by which liberty is reconciled with
authority; and just as surely as we must strive to maintain a maximum amount of individual liberty, we must realize that authority,
too, has its claim in a constitutional republic such as ours. Indeed,
the very idea of law is ultimately based on the authority of the state
to enforce that law, as events throughout our Nation's history have
on more than one occasion demonstrated. Authority in this sense of
the word is not only the indispensable condition of all government,
including self-government, but it is the ultimate guardian against
a state of anarchy in which only the strong would be free.
But there are subtler hues in the background of this subject
than stark authority on one side and rampant liberty on the other.
Friedrich Hayek's The Road to Serfdom," published a generation
ago, is the philosophical embodiment of nineteenth century English
liberalism.4 3 Hayek would greatly doubt that there were very many
justifications for allowing the state to deny claims of individual
rights because of possible threat to institutions within the state
41. See Burger, Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63
A.B.A.J. 504, 505-06 (1977).
42. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
43. See Introduction in ROADS TO FREEDOM at xii-xiv (E. Streissler ed. 1969).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

which would result from the litigation of those rights. In The Road
to Serfdom, he castigates Auguste Comte, whom he describes as
"that nineteenth century totalitarian,"" for describing claims of
individual rights as against the state as "the perennial Western
Malady, the revolt of the individual against the species. "' 45'
If I had to choose between Hayek and Comte as philosophical
godfathers, I would certainly choose the former. But the libertarians
of our day, who regard any restraint on individual freedom, or at
least any restraint of which they do not approve, as requiring an
extraordinarily high degree of justification, have not captured the
entire essence of a constitutional democracy. There are times when
the claims of the individual should be subordinated to those of the
"species," even if the species is not government itself but a private
institution which serves a useful purpose.
Those who make our laws, and in a democracy that means just
about all of us directly or indirectly, serve us poorly if they do not
recognize that the world in which we live is an intricate web of
relationships between people, private institutions and government
at its various levels. Many agencies of government and many private institutions have existed for longer than any living person.
While this should not confer upon them by prescription a power to
ride roughshod over the claims of individuals, it should make courts
and legislatures chary of submitting to de novo review by a neutral
magistrate resolutions of an individual's claim by such an institution. I think the philosopher who saw this most clearly was Edmund
Burke, who, though a Whig and a champion of the American colonists in their dispute with the mother country, was undeniably a
conservative at heart. He abhorred the idea, espoused in turn by
Hobbes, Locke and Paine, that the relationship between individual
citizens and their government was essentially that of master and
servant to be governed by the law of agency. 6 While he approved of
many institutions and ideas which are totally anachronistic in our
time, he did demolish, for me at least, the idea that society is based
on nothing more than an implied contract between the citizens and
their current government. Society for him included not only citizen
and government, but institutions as well; it was bequeathed by our
forefathers to us in trust for generations yet unborn. And though he
never said so in so many words, I think he would have doubted the
44. See HAYEK, supra note 42, at 16.
45. Id.
46. There are, of course, significant distinctions between the political philosophies of
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Thomas Paine, which do not seem to me to be essential to
the point which I address here.

19781

THE ADVERSARY SOCIETY

wisdom of subjecting to the adversary process every dispute that
might arise out of this complicated network of relationships. Perhaps I can do no better than close my remarks with a quotation from
his familiar Reflections on the Revolution in France:
Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure-but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better
than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee,
calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up
for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy
of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because
it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross
animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership
in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a
partnership not only between those who are living, but between
those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to
be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in
the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower
with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible
world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable
oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their
appointed place. 7
47. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 93-94 (E. Rhys 1910). Burke
criticized the notion of a social contract, which was drafted without a careful consideration
of a variety of traditional institutions, as follows:
The third head of right, asserted by the pulpit of the Old Jewry, namely, the
"right to form a government for ourselves," has, at least, as little countenance
from anything done at the Revolution, either in precedent or principle, as the two
first of their claims. The Revolution was made to preserve our ancient indisputable laws and liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which is our
only security for law and liberty. If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of our
constitution, and the policy which predominated in that great period which has
secured it to this hour, pray look for both in our histories, in our records, in our
acts of parliament, and journals of parliament, and not in the sermons of the Old
Jewry, and the after-dinner toasts of the Revolution Society. In the former you
will find other ideas and another language. Such a claim is as illsuited to our
temper and wishes as it is unsupported by any appearance of authority. The very
idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough to fill us with disgust and
horror. We wished at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all
we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers. Upon that body and stock of
inheritance we have taken care not to innoculate any scion alien to the nature of
the original plant. All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded
upon the principle of reverence to antiquity; and I hope, nay I am persuaded, that
all those which possibly may be made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon
analogical precedent, authority, and example.
Id. at 29 (emphasis in original).
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The reverence for traditional institutions espoused by Burke does not preclude a forwardlooking or progressive view of government. Such reverence merely provides that change will
be tempered by experience. Burke posited that reformers who abandoned the inheritance of
institutions bequeathed by their forefathers threatened the long-term success of reforms they
hoped to institute. He leveled this charge at his opponents: "People will not look forward to
posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors." Id. at 31.

